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ABSTRACT 
Atheists are some of the least liked people in the world.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that in most stigmatized groups, increased 
prevalence of the group increases prejudice towards the group. However, the 
opposite has been found with atheists- increased perceived prevalence 
decreases prejudice towards atheists. One post-hoc explanation provided for this 
difference is that since atheists are easily concealable and unorganized as a 
group, their greater prevalence may not be perceived as a threat. In the present 
thesis, I 1) attempted to replicate the existing finding that perceived increased 
prevalence would increase trust towards atheists and 2) directly tested the 
hypothesis that if atheist groups are presented as collectively powerful and 
coherent, increased prevalence will no longer decrease anti-atheist prejudice. I 
did not find support for the hypothesis that prevalence increases atheist trust, nor 
did I find support for my hypotheses that power and cohesion would manipulate 
distrust. Atheist prejudice is still pervasive, however, prejudice against atheists 
may be changing. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Prejudice Against Atheists  
Atheists tend to be the least liked people in the world, compared to other 
stigmatized groups (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Anti-atheist prejudice is rooted in 
distrust of atheists, and has been demonstrated to be a strong and prevalent 
form of prejudice (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Gervais, 2011; Gervais, 
2013). Typically, prejudice increases as perceived size of the disliked group 
increases (Cottrell, & Neuberg, 2005). However, the opposite is true of atheists- 
increased perceived number of atheists has been demonstrated to decrease anti-
atheist prejudice (Gervais, 2011). Gervais (2011) suggested this reversal may be 
because atheists are not collectively powerful, coherent, or visible, however, this 
has yet to be formally tested. In the present thesis, I tested if the powerlessness, 
incoherence, and invisibility of atheists explains why increased prevalence 
decreases anti-atheist prejudice.      
 Approximately 12% of Americans surveyed online do not believe in God 
(Gallup Poll, 2017) however, a recent study that quantified non-believers without 
directly asking people to label themselves as “atheists” suggests the prevalence 
of atheists in the United States may be as high as 26% (Gervais & Najle, 2018). 
Individuals who self-identify as agnostic or atheist report experiencing 
discrimination (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012). They report 
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experiencing different types of discrimination like denial of services, being the 
victim of a hate crime, and social ostracism (Hammer, Cragun, Hwang, & Smith, 
2012). Consistent with earlier research findings that high group identification 
buffers against the psychological consequences of discrimination (Branscombe, 
Schmitt & Harvey, 1999), stronger group identification buffers against some of 
the negative psychological effects of discrimination in atheists as well (Doane & 
Elliot, 2015). In these ways, anti-atheist prejudice is similar to other forms of 
prejudice.  
The sociofunctional approach to understanding out-group prejudice 
provides one explanation for anti-atheist prejudice. The sociofunctional approach 
argues that motivation for preferential in-group treatment influences people to 
behave prejudicially toward out-group members (Brewer, 1999). This approach 
postulates that individuals may have different responses to members of different 
out-groups based on the particular threat that out-group poses. For example, in a 
study of emotional responses to different out-groups, participants demonstrated 
prejudice against feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men; however, 
they had different emotional reactions to each group. Participants reported 
feeling more disgust towards gay men, and more anger and resentment towards 
fundamentalist Christians and feminists. These groups were perceived to have 
unique threats. Feminists were perceived to be a threat towards social 
coordination while fundamentalist Christians were perceived to be a threat to 
freedoms. These emotions that trigger prejudicial responses may be adaptive in 
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ensuring that one’s in-group is well-provided for (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The 
motivation to respond negatively to out-group members stems from the desire to 
ensure preferential treatment towards the in-group. Atheists are perceived as 
posing a threat to morals and social cooperation (Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 
2011). Understanding this unique threat may be useful in understanding unique 
features of anti-atheist prejudice.    
Studies of stereotypes about atheists held by non-believers support the 
sociofunctional approach to understanding anti-atheist prejudice. After being 
primed with religious words, believers demonstrated more negative attitudes 
towards value violating groups (like homosexuals and atheists). This relationship 
persisted after controlling for participant’s self-reported religiosity. This suggests 
that group membership is part of what motivates anti-atheist prejudice (Johnson, 
Rowatt & LaBouff, 2012).  Harper (2007) found that common negative 
stereotypes held by college-aged believers about non-believers included beliefs 
that they were hard-headed, cynical, daring, rebellious, faithless, and 
argumentative. These traits were not attributed to other stigmatized groups or 
other religious minorities. This suggests atheists are perceived as posing a 
unique threat to believers, and that may drive discrimination and prejudice.  
However, anti-atheist prejudice is a particularly strong form of prejudice, and it is 
not limited to religious individuals. While other stigmatized groups in America 
have become increasingly more accepted over the last few decades, atheists 
continue to be increasingly disliked. Using data from Gallup polls, Edgell, Gerteis, 
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and Hartmann (2006) identified that atheists are less likely to be openly accepted 
than any other religious, ethnic, and sexual minority group.  
Furthermore, atheists were the group that differed most from participants’ 
“vision of American society,” and atheists were the group they would disapprove 
most of if their children were to marry. To further understand why people dislike 
atheists, Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011) used vignettes of an 
untrustworthy person to measure the conjunction fallacy, in which negative 
attributes are associated with a particular kind of person. They found that 
participants were more likely to attribute untrustworthy characteristic to an atheist 
than they were to other stigmatized groups. This demonstrated that other 
stigmatized groups are disliked (homosexuals, feminists, liberals, etc.), but are 
trusted more than atheists.  Giddings & Dunn (2016) conducted a study using the 
same methodology but they included assessments of the respondents’ religious 
identification. They found that although non-religious people made fewer 
conjunction errors, they still maintained greater distrust of atheists than of 
religious people. This suggests that atheist prejudice is robust in that it 
generalizes across judgments about atheists. While out-group threat may explain 
some of the prejudice atheists experience, it does not fully explain it (Giddings & 
Dunn, 2016). 
Distrust in atheists may originate from a moral distrust. Moral distrust 
occurs when an individual expects another individual or group of people to not 
behave pro-socially. Moral distrust operates under the assumption that someone 
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who does not believe in God may act immorally because they do not believe in a 
socially monitoring all-knowing power who encourages pro-sociality, which would 
then encourage prosocial behavior in believers (Gervais, 2013). Such distrust 
may be founded. Shariff and Norenzayan (2011) demonstrated that participants 
who believed in a punitive God, compared to a loving God, were less likely to 
cheat on a test that would display the correct answer to participants if they did 
not take action to not see the answer. This suggests that belief in a punitive God 
does increase rule following and promotes pro-sociality. Other studies support 
the notion that people’s intuitions are that non-believers are less likely to be 
prosocial. For example, Simpson and Rios (2017) had participants write a list of 
core moral values that an atheist would hold and analyzed ratings of perceived 
atheist morals. They found that anti-atheist prejudice is explained by the fear that 
atheists will not act kindly or caring towards others. Swan and Heesacker (2012) 
tested whether the term atheist itself had negative connotations or if it was the 
non-belief in God that influenced distrust. They demonstrated that it was the non-
belief in God that made even likeable individuals untrustworthy, rather than the 
atheist label itself. This further suggests that religion is used as a cue to 
trustworthiness. The belief that since atheists do not believe in a socially 
monitoring God they will not behave pro-socially, and will not cooperate, 
motivates distrust (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Shariff, Norenzayan, 2011). 
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Factors that Reduce Anti-Atheist Prejudice  
Researchers have demonstrated three contexts that decrease atheist 
distrust: interaction with atheists, the presence of secular authority, and 
increased atheist prevalence. Researchers have tested how imagined 
interactions with atheists affects prejudice towards them. After imaging an 
interaction with an atheist, compared to the control group who thought only about 
atheists, but not interacting with them, participants reported less distrust, more 
willingness to cooperate with, and more willingness to engage with an atheist 
(LaBouff & Ledoux, 2016). This research demonstrates that perceived interaction 
decreased prejudice against atheists.  
 The presence of secular rule of law also has been shown to reduce anti-
atheist prejudice. Since atheist distrust stems from the perception that a socially 
monitoring God is necessary for prosociality, distrust towards atheists may be 
reduced if people perceive that secular organizations are also sources of social 
monitoring. When participants watched a video regarding secular authority, they 
demonstrated less distrust of atheists than did participants who watched a control 
video or did not watch a video (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Furthermore, in 
countries with strong secular authorities, negative attitudes towards atheists are 
less common than in regions with weaker secular authorities (Norenzayan & 
Gervais, 2015). Reminders of secular authority may decrease prejudice against 
atheists because it demonstrates that secular institutions can also provide social 
monitoring and enforce pro-social behavior.  
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Finally, atheist distrust also reduces when perceived prevalence of 
atheism increases. Gervais (2011) conducted four studies analyzing the effects 
of atheist prevalence on anti-atheist prejudice. Using a diverse sample of 54 
countries, the first study established that in countries with high atheist 
prevalence, prejudice against atheists was lower at an international level. This 
correlational relationship was still significant after controlling for socioeconomic 
development and differences between individualist and collectivist cultures. The 
second study established that high atheist prevalence was negatively associated 
with atheist prejudice at the individual level. This relationship was still significant 
after controlling for belief in God and belief in a dangerous world.  The third study 
provided causal evidence that perceived atheist prevalence reduces anti-atheist 
prejudice. Participants read that local atheist prevalence was either high or low. 
High atheist prevalence was associated with lower explicit distrust. Finally, in the 
fourth study Gervais employed the IAT (Greenwald, McGee &Schwartz, 1998) to 
show that when prevalence was high, implicit distrust against atheists decreased. 
These results demonstrated that high atheist prevalence reduces prejudice and 
distrust of atheists.  
This finding is a reversal from how perceived group prevalence typically 
affects prejudice. Other research has demonstrated that greater the perceived 
group size, the greater the prejudice (Cottrell, & Neuberg, 2005). Larger groups 
size generally equates with perceiving a greater threat. For example, in an effort 
to understand prejudice towards immigrants, researchers found that Dutch 
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citizens who perceived large immigrant population size also held anti-immigrant 
attitudes and felt their group interests were threatened (Schlueter & Scheepers, 
2010).  Similarly, Quillian (1995) demonstrated that perceived group threat 
towards immigrants is associated with group size, and as group size increases 
so does prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants. Gervais (2011) argued that 
since atheists are not visible, powerful, nor collectively coherent, increased 
atheist prevalence would not equate with increased threat. Atheists are not 
united in their lack of belief because this lack of belief can originate from a variety 
of sources (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Similarly, atheists tend to report low 
in-group identification compared to religious groups, which may influence their 
lack of group coherence or organization (Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson, & 
Anisman, 2012). Atheists are easily concealable (they cannot be identified 
through outward appearance), which makes their self-disclosure their only 
identifying characteristic. Information that atheists are prevalent communicates to 
people that the existence of many atheists will not negatively affect their social or 
moral systems. Thus, it may be that people are less distrustful of them when they 
are presented as being high in numbers.  
The explanation for the reduction of atheist distrust, in response to 
information about high atheist prevalence, operates on the assumption that 
atheists as a group are not collectively coherent or powerful. In the present study, 
I manipulated participants’ perceptions of the coherence and collective power of 
atheists to determine if this explains why increased prevalence reduces distrust 
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toward atheists. I also explored the potential covarying effects of political 
orientation on the relationship between prevalence and atheist distrust. It may be 
that individuals who are more conservative are less likely to trust atheists than 
individuals who are more liberal. I also explored the potential mediating effects of 
belief in God, as Gervais (2011) did, religious importance, and the belief that 
atheists are the cause of moral decline in society. The goals of the present study 
were twofold: First, I attempted to replicate Gervais’ finding that increased 
prevalence reduces prejudice. Second, I intended to extend these findings by 
demonstrating that increased prevalence only decreases distrust if atheists are 
perceived as not collectively coherent or powerful. I tested the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: If no information about the collective coherence of atheists 
is provided, increased prevalence will increase trust of atheists. 
Hypothesis 2: If atheists are described as collectively incoherent and not 
powerful, increased prevalence will increase trust of atheists, similar to if no 
information is provided. 
Hypothesis 3: If atheists are described as collectively coherent and 
powerful, increased prevalence will increase atheist distrust.     
Hypothesis 4: Belief that atheists are the cause of moral decline in society 
will mediate the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence, and 
atheist distrust.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
PILOT DATA  
 
Gervais (2011) participants’ read a report about atheist prevalence relative 
to other groups on their university campus and worldwide. Prevalence was 
manipulated to be either high or low. Respondents indicated their distrust 
towards atheists, religiosity, general feelings towards atheists, and perceived 
contact with atheists. I used a similar study design, stimuli, and outcome 
measures to test my hypotheses. Following Gervais’ (2011) procedure, I 
conducted a pilot study of perceived atheist prevalence in the sample population 
to generate “high” and “low” prevalence values. 
Gervais (2011) collected pilot data to create an average of student 
perceptions of atheists and then manipulated that average for high and low 
atheist prevalence number. Gervais asked participants to provide a percentage 
estimate of atheist prevalence at their university. Approximately forty percent of 
his participants estimated that the university had five percent or fewer atheists, 
and less than five percent of his participants estimated an atheist prevalence of 
above thirty percent. On average, his participants reported a perceived atheist 
prevalence of about twelve percent (11.45%,SD = 9.49%). He decided to use fifty 
percent in his manipulated report to operationalize high prevalence, and five 
percent to represent low prevalence, arguing that these estimates would be quite 
high and realistically low respectively.  
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I collected my own pilot data to survey student’s perception of different 
group’s prevalence. 111 (86 females) students reported their percentage 
estimate of each of the following groups: Atheists, vegans, Buddhists, and Jews. 
Participants reported they thought atheists to be more common than Gervais’ 
participants (M=27%, SD=19%). This is contrary to Gervais’ pilot data; in which 
forty percent of Gervais’ participant’s estimated atheist prevalence to be below 
thirty percent, and only five percent of his participants estimated prevalence to be 
above thirty percent.  Participants in the lowest quartile reported atheists to make 
up ten percent of the university’s population, while participants in the highest 
quartile reported atheists at forty percent. Only about thirteen percent (12.6%) of 
my participants estimated that the university had five percent or fewer atheists, 
and almost seventy percent (65.8%) estimated an atheist prevalence above thirty 
percent. 
Our participants believed atheists to be more prevalent than Gervais’ 
(2011) participants, so five percent atheist prevalence would still be a good low. 
Our participants did not believe atheists to be more than fifty percent prevalent.  
Because of this, I decided to use Gervais (2011) original manipulated prevalence 
of five percent of low atheist prevalence and fifty percent for high atheist 
prevalence. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
METHOD 
Participants 
G-power analysis revealed that for a small effect size of, ηp2 = .04 (p < 
.05), a sample of, n = 200 participants will be needed to obtain statistical power 
at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988). However, due to a large attention 
check fail rate of forty eight percent in the first data collection period, I recollected 
data with new quality detectors and increased my sample to 450 participants. In 
the first data collection period, I collected data from 305 participants, of which 
170 participants (males= 63) passed attention checks. The majority of these 
participants indicated being Latino or Hispanic (69%), and were, on average, 20 
years old (median= 19, range: 18-51). In the second data collection period, I 
added participants to ensure that after exclusion, based on attention check 
failure, I would maintain satisfactory power in all six of my conditions. I collected 
data from 220 participants, of which 181 (males = 19) participants passed 
attention checks. The majority of these participants indicated being Latino or 
Hispanic (70%), and were, on average 23.5 years old (median = 22, range: 18-
55). After combining both data collection periods and excluding participants who 
failed attention checks (n = 149), data from 350 participants were used in 
analysis. The majority of participants were female (n = 286) and identified as 
13 
 
Hispanic (n = 246), with a mean age of 21.84 years (Median = 20, age range: 18-
55). 
To mask the study goals and hypotheses, participants were told that they 
were reading news articles about different groups on the university campus. At 
the end of the study participants were debriefed with the true purpose of the 
study.  There were no gender or major restrictions on participation. All 
participants were recruited online through the Department of Psychology Subject 
Pool SONA site and redirected to Qualtrics to complete the study. Upon 
completion of the study, participants were compensated 0.5 unit of credit to be 
granted towards a psychology course of their choosing. This study was approved 
by CSUSB psychology department’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
Measures 
Atheist Prevalence and Power/Coherence Manipulation 
Participants read one of six news articles adapted from Gervais (2011) 
that described atheist prevalence, power, and coherence. Half of the articles 
claimed that atheist prevalence worldwide and at the participant’s university was 
high (10% worldwide and 50% on campus) and half claimed that prevalence was 
low (rare worldwide and 10% on campus). Gervais’s original stimuli contained no 
information about atheist power/coherence. Two of the articles were almost 
identical to Gervais’ (2011) and only provided information about prevalence 
(high/low). I altered the university name to be that of the participants in my study. 
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I edited the additional four articles to include explicit information about atheist 
power and coherence as a group and each article represented a different 
experimental condition (high prevalence/high power and coherence, high 
prevalence/low power and coherence, low prevalence/high power and 
coherence, low prevalence/low power and coherence; Appendix A).   
Atheist Distrust  
I used two scales of atheist prejudice. The first was a two-item distrust 
measure that Gervais (2011) used. Participants rated the items “Atheists are 
dishonest,” and, “Atheists are trustworthy.” on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree). I reverse scored the first item and took the average 
of the two items to compute the variable atheist distrust (α = .72). On average, 
across conditions, participants did not find atheists to be particularly distrustful (M 
= -1.05, SD = 1.46).   
I also used The Negative Attitudes Towards Atheists scale as a second 
measure of atheist distrust (Gervais & Shariff, 2010). This scale includes seven 
items that measure explicit anti-atheist prejudice. Items include, “In times of crisis 
I am more inclined to trust people who are religious,” “I would be uncomfortable 
with an atheist teaching my child,” and “Societies function better if everyone 
believes in God.” I took the average of the items to compute the negative 
attitudes towards atheist measure, I found the atheist distrust scale to be valid (α 
= .72, M = 26.86, SD = 7.88).  
15 
 
Gervais’ (2011) assumption was that atheist threat was explaining why 
prevalence effects atheist distrust. I included an item to directly assess how 
threatening participants perceived atheists as a group. Participants rated their 
agreement on the following item, “Atheists are not a threat as a group (M = 2.00, 
SD = 0.87; seven-point scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree).  
Atheists are the Cause of Moral Decline  
To asses if participants believed that atheists are one cause of moral 
decline in society and if that influenced their distrust of atheists, participants 
responded to one item: “Atheists are one cause of moral decline in society” and 
rated their agreement on a seven-point scale (M = -1.10, SD = 1.58;-3= strongly 
disagree and 3= strongly agree).   
Religious Belief  
To assess if belief in God moderated the relationship between prevalence 
and distrust, participants responded to the following item, “I believe in God,” on a 
scale of -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree).  To assess if religious 
importance impacted the relationship between prevalence and distrust, 
participants rated their agreement with the following: “My religion is important to 
me” (seven-point scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree).  
On average, participants reported having a strong belief in God (M = 1.84, 
SD = 1.83), with about eighty percent (80.40%) of participants indicating at least 
some belief in God (a score of 1 or greater). The majority of participants indicated 
that their religion was of importance to them (M = 1.23, SD = 1.83), with almost 
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seventy percent (69.80%) of participants indicating that their religion is at least 
somewhat important to them (a score of one or greater). 
Political Orientation  
 To asses if political orientation moderated the relationship between 
prevalence and atheist distrust, participants responded to three items: “I tend to 
be more liberal than I am conservative” and “I tend to be more conservative than 
I am liberal.” I reverse-scored the first item and took the average of these two 
items to create a composite measure of political conservatism (α = .88; seven-
point scale, -3= strongly disagree, 3= strongly agree).  On average, participants 
reported being less conservative than they were liberal (M = 3.52, SD = 1.69). 
Participants also indicted their political party by choosing one of the 
following options: Democratic, Republican, No party affiliation, and prefer not to 
answer. The majority of participants identified as democratic (n = 211), however 
100 participants chose to not disclose their party affiliation (Republican n = 41).  
Alternative Explanations  
 Gervais (2011) collected a number of measures to rule out alternative 
explanations, I collected the same measures in the case that I replicated his 
prevalence decreasing distrust finding.   
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Perceived Contact.  Participants responded to an open-ended prompt 
asking them how many atheists they know (Gervais, 2011). On average, 
participants claimed to know around three atheists (Median = 2.00, SD = 4.93). 
Then participants rated their agreement (-3 = strongly disagree, 3 = strongly 
agree) to the following statements, “I often come into contact with atheists,” and 
“I rarely come into contact with atheists” (Gervais, 2011). I reverse coded the 
item “I rarely come into contact with atheists” and took the average of the two 
items to compute the scale: atheist contact (α = .89) Participants did not report 
frequently coming into contact with atheists (M = 6.79, SD = 3.84).  
General Attitudes. I measured attitudes towards atheists using a standard 
0-100 “feeling thermometer.” Where participants rated the warmth or coldness 
they felt towards atheists (lower scores indicate colder feelings). Participants did 
not report particularly cold, nor warm feelings towards atheists (M = 57.85, SD = 
23.17).  
 Manipulation Checks  
Prevalence Manipulation Check. Participants rated a single-item measure 
stating, “Atheists are very common” on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree).  
Power/Cohesion Manipulation Check. The following two items assessed 
atheist cohesion and power: “Atheists are becoming powerful as a group” and 
“Atheists are becoming cohesive as a group”. Participants rated these 
statements on a seven-point scale (-3= strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree).  
18 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Data Screening 
Outliers  
Outliers were identified using z-scores greater than or equal to, z = 3.3, p 
< .001. No outliers were identified using this criterion.   
Normality  
Normality was determined by taking the z-scores of skewness and 
kurtosis and by using the criteria, z = 3.3, p < .001. Using this criteria, normality 
for all variables was assumed.   
Manipulation Checks  
There was a significant effect of prevalence on the belief that atheists are 
common, F(1, 350) = 351.22, p < .001. Participants in the low prevalence 
conditions were more likely to believe that atheists were less common (M = -1.22, 
SD = 1.88) than participants in the high prevalence conditions, who believed 
atheists were more common (M = 1.94, SD = 1.25). This indicates that the stimuli 
were effective in influencing participant’s perceptions about atheist prevalence.  
There was a significant effect of power and coherence on the belief that 
atheists are powerful, F(1, 350) = 53.73, p < .001, and the belief that atheists are 
cohesive, F(1, 350) = 63.55, p < .001. Participants in the atheist in the high 
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power and cohesion conditions were more likely to believe that atheists were 
powerful (M = 0.62, SD = 1.70) and cohesive as a group (M = 0.82, SD = 1.35) 
than participants in the low power and cohesion group who believed atheists 
were less powerful (M = -0.80, SD = 1.75) and cohesive (M = -0.54, SD = 1.61). 
This indicates that my power and cohesion conditions adequately influenced 
participant’s beliefs about atheist power and group coherence.  
Tests of Hypotheses 1-3  
To test Hypotheses 1-3, I implemented a 3 (Group Organization: high, low, 
no information control) X 2 (Prevalence: high, low) study design. I took the 
average of the two items: atheists are trustworthy (reverse coded) and atheists 
are dishonest to compute the variable: atheist distrust, as Gervais (2011) did. 
The model was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.98, p > .05. The main effect of 
prevalence was not significant, F(1,350) = 0.87, p > .05. The main effect of group 
organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.61, p > .05.  The interaction 
between prevalence and group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 
0.08, p > 0.05. There were no significant differences in atheist distrust scores 
across the six groups (Table 1). Therefore, I did not find support for Hypotheses 
1-3. 
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of atheist distrust across conditions  
 Prevalence High Prevalence Low 
Organization Mean SD Mean SD 
High 2.62 1.15 2.77 1.18 
20 
 
Low 2.56 0.94 2.64 1.22 
No Information 2.52 0.91 2.88 1.21 
 
I conducted the same 3x2 ANOVA using scores on the Negative Attitudes 
Towards Atheists Scale as the dependent variable. Again, I did not find support 
for Hypotheses 1-3. The model was not significant, F(5,350) = 0.41, p >.05. The 
main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(1,350) = 0.16, p >. 05 . The main 
effect of group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 1.26, p > 0.05 .  
The interaction between prevalence and group organization was also not 
significant, F(1,350) = 0.67, p > .05 . There were no significant differences in 
negative attitudes towards atheists scores across the six groups (Table 2).    
 
Table 2. Negative attitudes towards atheists across conditions 
 Prevalence High Prevalence Low 
Organization  Mean SD Mean SD 
High 3.91  1.13 3.86  1.06 
Low 3.66 1.20 3.82 1.16 
No Information 3.87 1.11 3.82 1.13 
 
I conducted the same 3x2 ANOVA using Atheists are a threat as the 
dependent variable. Again, I did not find support for Hypotheses 1-3. The model 
was not significant, F(5,350) = 0.68, p > .05. The main effect of prevalence was 
not significant, F(1,350) = 0.03, p > .05 . The main effect of group organization 
was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.72, p > .05 .  The interaction between 
prevalence and group organization was also not significant, F(1,350) = 0.57, p 
21 
 
>.05 . There were no significant differences in negative attitudes towards atheists 
scores across the six groups (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Atheists are a threat across conditions  
 Prevalence High Prevalence Low 
Organization  Mean SD Mean SD 
High 2.06  0.86 2.00 0.86 
Low 1.90  0.90 1.99 0.87 
No Information 1.41 1.60 1.35 1.68 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Because there was no evidence of a relationship between prevalence or 
power and coherence and trust, there was no reason to test Hypothesis four, as 
the function of Hypothesis 4 was to test a mediator of the relationship between 
prevalence/power/coherence and trust.  
Covariates  
I tested three potential covariates using the two-item atheist distrust 
composite as the outcome variable and prevalence and power/coherence as 
predictors in a 3x2 ANCOVA design. None of the potential covariates were 
significantly correlated with atheist distrust: Belief in God (r = -.04, p > .05), 
religious importance (r = .01, p > .05), and, political conservatism, (r = .10, p > 
.05). Belief in God did not significantly correlate with prevalence within conditions 
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(r = .03, p > .05). However, political conservatism was nearly significant in the 
ANCOVA. 
I ran an ANCOVA to test the hypothesis that political orientation 
significantly affected the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence 
and atheist distrust. Political conservatism significantly covaried with atheist 
distrust, F(1, 350) = 4.08, p < .05. However, Political conservatism did not 
significantly affect the relationship between prevalence, power and coherence 
and atheist distrust, F(5, 350) = 0.937, p > .05. The main effect of prevalence 
was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.08, p > .05. The main effect of organization was 
not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.20, p > .05. The interaction between prevalence and 
organization was not significant, F(5, 350) = 0.18, p > .05. Political conservatism 
was not a significant covariate.  
Controlling for belief in God did not significantly affect the relationship 
between prevalence, coherence and power and atheist distrust, F(5, 350)  1.17, 
p > .05. The main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(1, 350) = 0.02, p > 
.05. The main effect of organization was not significant, F(1, 350) = .21, p > .05. 
The interaction between prevalence and organization was not significant, F(1, 
350) = .15, p > .05. Belief in God was not a significant covariate.   
Controlling for religious importance did not significantly affect the 
relationship between prevalence, power and coherence and atheist distrust, F(5, 
350) = 1.05, p > .05.  The main effect of prevalence was not significant, F(5, 350) 
= 0.08, p > .05. The main effect of organization was not significant, F(5, 350) = 
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0.14, p > .05. The interaction between prevalence and organization was not 
significant, F(5, 350) = 0.12, p > .05. Religious importance was not a significant 
covariate.    
 
Table 4. Political Conservatism as a covariate across conditions 
 Prevalence High Prevalence Low 
Organization  Mean SD Mean SD 
High 2.06  0.86 2.00 0.86 
Low 1.90  0.90 1.99 0.87 
No Information 1.41 1.60 1.35 1.68 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
DISCUSSION  
 
I investigated factors that may influence trust, a unique form of prejudice, 
towards atheists. Specifically, I attempted to replicate Gervais (2011) finding that 
perceived increased atheist prevalence decreased distrust towards atheists. I 
hypothesized that because atheists are not powerful nor cohesive as a group, 
they do not pose a threat when participants perceive there to be more of them. 
Therefore, if participates were lead to believe that atheists are collectively 
powerful and coherent, the positive effects of increased prevalence would 
dissipate. If participants perceived there to be few atheists who are collectively 
powerful and cohesive, their distrust of atheists should increase. I hypothesized 
that political orientation may covary the relationship between prevalence and 
distrust, specifically that individuals who are more conservative may distrust 
atheists more than individuals who are liberal.  
Although the false news manipulation was successful in convincing 
participants that atheists were either prevalent or not and either powerful and 
coherent or not, I did not replicate Gervais (2011) finding that increased atheist 
prevalence decreases atheist distrust. I did not find support for my hypotheses 
that increased power and coherence would increase atheist distrust.  
I found that atheist prejudice is not influenced by atheist prevalence, 
atheist power or atheist coherence. A number of factors could explain my finding. 
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First, it may be that atheists pose threats unique to their individual characteristic 
and not their group size. It may be that disbelief in God, and therefore the 
assumption that an individual will not behave prosocially, is equally threatening 
individually and in larger numbers. Therefore, participant’s perceptions of atheist 
group size may not matter. ne atheist may pose the same perceived threat to 
prosociality and group cooperation as a group of many atheists may. It may only 
take one individual to pose a large threat to cooperation, therefore, it may be 
more realistic for participants to only focus on the feasibility of one individual 
behaving non-prosocial.  
Another possibility is that Gervais’ (2011) original finding was a non-
replicable false positive. The replication crisis, which came to fruition in 2012, has 
caused debate, concern, and within recent years, close examination amongst 
psychologists. There have been a number of proposed causes for the replication 
crisis within social psychology. The file drawer problem, a term penned by 
Rosenthal (1979), proposes that failed psychology studies are rarely, if ever, 
published. The field of social psychology tends to only acknowledge significant 
findings while non-significant findings are stored in the “file drawer”. Therefore, 
psychologists have little incentive to seek publication for non-significant findings. 
There have been fewer replication studies in recent years, highlighting the 
problem that only inventive and significant research is valued (Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012). While Gervais (2011) was able to replicate his own 
findings, I did not succeed. Gervais (2011, Study 4) replicated his findings that 
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experimentally manipulating participant’s perceived prevalence of atheists 
decreased distrust independent of atheist contact. He even expanded upon these 
findings by demonstrating that participant’s implicit distrust towards atheists were 
reduced when they were lead to believe that atheists were more common. It is 
important to note that the first two studies he conducted were correlational in 
nature- he observed a relationship between prevalence and distrust, and was 
only able to experimentally replicate prevalence decreasing distrust in one study.   
Therefore, he replicated his own findings in the final study he conducted. There is 
no evidence in the literature to suggest that there has been a replication of these 
findings since.  
Another explanation for my null findings is that as atheists become more 
recognizable and prevalent in society (Gallup Polls, 2017), atheist distrust may 
be decreasing. My study was conducted 7 years after the publication of Gervais’ 
study. A recent pew research survey found adults under fifty years old, are less 
likely to believe in a biblical God. These younger adults are also less likely to 
believe in a God or higher spiritual power (although, belief in God is still more 
common than disbelief), they are also less likely to subscript to a particular 
religion or denomination (Pew Research, 2018). It may be that since younger 
people tend not to identify with a particular religion and instead are more likely to 
believe in a higher power or God, they may not view atheists as such a 
threatening outgroup, compared to other groups.  
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My sample mirrored Gervais (2011) sample in many ways: I collected data 
from a population of university students and the majority of my participants were 
female. However, my participants varied in two critical ways. First, many of my 
participants failed attention checks and had to be excluded from the study, which 
brings concern to the efficacy of the data. I had hoped to address this issue by 
informing participants they would only be compensated if they passed the 
attention checks. Second, due to differences between atheist prevalence belief 
between Gervais (2011) participants, and my own, it may be that my participants 
were less prejudiced against atheists. In my pilot data collection, I found that 
students believed atheists to be more prevalent on average, than students at the 
University of Kentucky. It may be that prevalence did not increase trust because 
participants already believed atheists to be prevalent. This may result in their 
atheist prejudice being unaffected by atheist prevalence.  
In an attempt to understand why my manipulation of power and coherence 
was unsuccessful in increasing or decreasing prejudice, I propose that it may 
have been informative to measure distrust towards atheists before the presence 
of the manipulation. By taking a premeasure of atheist distrust, I may have been 
able to determine if participants were greatly or slightly prejudiced towards 
atheists, resulting in a ceiling or floor effect, explaining why my replication was 
not successful. In an attempt to understand why my manipulation of prevalence 
was unsuccessful in influencing prevalence, I propose that individual uncontrolled 
differences between samples may have produced non-significant results, as 
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discussed above. Also, with my current study design I was not able to asses if 
there was any effect of my manipulation on participant’s implicit prejudice 
towards atheists. 
Implications  
As this research suggests, one avenue for successfully decreasing atheist 
distrust may not be a viable option for decreasing prejudice towards atheists. 
Atheist distrust may be more complicated and multifaceted than previous 
research suggests. Therefore, finding a one pill cures all solution may not be 
feasible. Other methods of decreasing atheist distrust must be explored.  
For this study, it may be that other factors are reducing atheist prejudice, 
nulling the effect of prevalence on distrust. Previous research has demonstrated 
that reminders of secular authority decrease atheist prejudice (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012). These participants live in a fairly liberal area with a strong 
secular presence. It may be that my participants perceived secular authority to be 
strong, and therefore the prevalence manipulation to decrease their prejudice did 
not work.  
This study also demonstrates the importance and vitality of testing 
replication hypotheses and attempting to expand on those hypotheses. While 
Gervais (2011) was able to replicate his result across two experimental studies, 
we were not. This suggests that the initial result on prevalence decreasing 
distrust may have had temporal, locational, or other interfering confounds. The 
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replication crisis is slowly being addressed, however, the field must provide 
incentives and motivation for researchers to replicate their colleagues work.  
Conclusions 
This research attempted to replicate a finding that resulted in decreased 
distrust towards atheists. I attempted to explain the underlining mechanism that 
resulted in the decreased prejudice. Instead, I discovered a potentially 
nonreplicable result. This failed replication may be due to shifting social 
perceptions about atheists, differing prevalence perceptions of atheists, or that 
atheists are becoming more recognizable in society. Other mechanisms need to 
be explored to attempt to explain anti atheist prejudice, and by explaining anti 
atheist prejudice, factors to reduce it can be discovered.  
Gervais (2011) suggested that accurately reflecting the increasing 
prevalence of atheists may increase trust towards them. However, my research 
suggests that this may not be the case. It may be that accurately reflecting 
prejudice does little or nothing to reduce distrust. Perhaps it may be that 
informing individuals’ of atheist prevalence can make atheists seem “pushy” with 
their disbelief, as Gervais (2013) noted as a potential limitation of publically 
exposing atheist prevalence. The literature on atheist distrust is sparse, even 
though the number of self-identifying atheists has grown in the last decades. 
More literature is needed to explore current attitudes towards atheists and the 
mechanisms that drive distrust towards atheists. By discovering and exploring 
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these mechanisms efforts can be made to continue to decrease the general 
public’s prejudice and distrust towards atheists.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
APPENDIX A 
MANIPULATED NEWS ARTICLES  
 
32 
 
 
Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Common and 
Cohesive/Powerful 
 
Worldwide Atheism Rates 
 
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not 
believe in God) are around the world. However, Philip Zuckerman has combed 
through a great deal of sociological research, and his results are striking.  
 
Zuckerman estimates that there are between 500 million and 700 million atheists 
in the world. That is nearly 10% of the world's population. Globally, atheists are 
58 times more numerous than Mormons, 41 times more numerous than Jews, 
and twice as numerous as Buddhists; nonbelievers constitute the fourth largest 
religious group in the world, trailing only Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. He 
also reported that atheists have become more cohesive and politically powerful 
as a group. They have formed organizations in most Western cities and each 
year an increasing number of atheists is elected to political office. They report 
being interested in changing social policy and criminal justice systems to better fit 
their ideals (Zuckerman, 2007).  
 
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates  
 
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous 
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are 
incredibly common. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find 
that approximately 50% of students indicate that they do not believe in God. 
These students have an active atheist group on campus, meet regularly, and 
atheist students are active in student governance. 
 
Clearly, atheists are very common. 
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Common and non-cohesive/ 
not powerful  
 
Worldwide Atheism Rates 
 
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not 
believe in God) are around the world. However, Philip Zuckerman has combed 
through a great deal of sociological research, and his results are striking.  
 
Zuckerman estimates that there are between 500 million and 700 million atheists 
in the world. That is nearly 10% of the world's population. Globally, atheists are 
58 times more numerous than Mormons, 41 times more numerous than Jews, 
and twice as numerous as Buddhists; nonbelievers constitute the fourth largest 
religious group in the world, trailing only Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. He 
also reported that atheists not become cohesive or politically powerful as a 
group. There are very few atheist organizations in most Western cities and very 
few atheists are elected to political office. (Zuckerman, 2007).  
 
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates  
 
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous 
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are 
incredibly common. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find 
that approximately 50% of students indicate that they do not believe in God. 
However, these students do not have an active atheist group on campus, do not 
meet regularly, and are unlikely to be active in student governance. 
 
Clearly, atheists are very common. 
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Uncommon and non-
cohesive/ not powerful 
 
Worldwide Atheism Rates 
 
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not 
believe in God) are around the world. Compared to the great world religions, 
atheists are fairly rare, and do not have a particularly visible worldwide presence. 
And, according to data from Norris and Inglehart (2006), atheists are becoming 
less common worldwide, relative to other religious groups. They also reported 
that atheists not become cohesive or politically powerful as a group. There are 
very few atheist organizations in most Western cities and very few atheists are 
elected to political office (Zuckerman, 2007). 
 
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates  
 
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous 
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are 
fairly uncommon. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find that 
only about 5% of students indicate that they are atheists. These students do not 
have an active atheist group on campus, do not meet regularly, and are unlikely 
to be active in student governance.  
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Atheist prevalence worldwide and at the University: Uncommon and cohesive/ 
Powerful 
 
 Worldwide Atheism Rates 
 
It can be quite difficult to determine how common atheists (people who do not 
believe in God) are around the world. Compared to the great world religions, 
atheists are fairly rare, and do not have a particularly visible worldwide presence. 
And, according to data from Norris and Inglehart (2006), atheists are becoming 
less common worldwide, relative to other religious groups. They also reported 
that atheists have become more cohesive and politically powerful as a group. 
They have formed organizations in most Western cities and each year an 
increasing number of atheists is elected to political office. They report being 
interested in changing social policy and criminal justice systems to better fit their 
ideals.  
CSUSB Psychology Atheism Rates  
 
Within the CSUSB psychology department, we have conducted numerous 
studies on peoples’ religious beliefs. Using these data, we find that atheists are 
fairly uncommon. Aggregating across a number of separate studies, we find that 
only about 5% of students indicate that they are atheists. These students have 
an active atheist group on campus, meet regularly, and atheist students are 
active in student governance.  
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I created the following items, established scales include citations:  
I read an article about how many Christians there are.  
1. Yes  
2. No  
3. Not sure  
I read an article about how many atheists there are.  
1. Yes  
2. No  
3. Not sure  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below. 
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
Atheists are dishonest  
Atheists are trustworthy  
Atheists are not a threat as a group 
Atheists are becoming powerful as a group 
Atheists are becoming cohesive as a group  
 
Please respond to the following prompt by typing your answer in the text entry 
box below. 
[Participants will type in their response]  
How many atheists do you know?  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below. 
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree]  
I often come into contact with atheists  
I rarely come into contact with atheists  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following items using the scale below. 
[Negative attitudes towards atheist scale (Gervais, Shariff, 2010), participants will 
rate their agreement with each item on a scale of -3= strongly disagree, 3= 
strongly agree]  
I would be uncomfortable with an atheist teaching my child  
I strongly believe that church and state should not be kept separate  
Societies function better if everyone believes in God  
Religion facilitates moral behavior in a way that nothing else can  
I would prefer to spend time with people who are religious believers  
In order to check for careless responding please choose mostly disagree for this 
item  
I would not at all be bothered if the United States president did not have religious 
beliefs  
In times of crisis, I am more inclined to trust people who are religious.  
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Please indicate on the below thermometer how you feel towards atheists. Higher 
ratings indicate more “warm” feelings while low ratings indicate “cold” feeling.   
[General attitudes thermometer. Participants will rate their “warmth” or “coldness” 
towards atheists. There will be a scale of 1-100 for participants to indicate their 
feelings towards atheists]  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below. 
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
I believe in God  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below. 
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
There cannot be morality without God.  
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below. 
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
My religion is important to me  
 
Demographic questions  
Please respond to the following questions  
[Participants will either select the answer that best describes them or type in their 
response]  
 
What is your age?  
[Text entry box] 
 
What is your gender?  
1. Male  
2. Female  
3. Prefer not to answer  
 
Please indicate the ethnicity that best describes you  
White  
Black or African American  
American Indian or Alaska Native  
Asian  
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
Latino or Hispanic  
Other   
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What is your major? [Text entry box] 
What year in school are you? [Text entry box] 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below.  
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
I tend to be more conservative than I am liberal.  
I tend to be more liberal than I am conservative.  
 
Please choose the option that best describes your political affiliation  
[Participants will choose one option that best describes their political affiliation 
with the option to not answer]  
1. Democratic  
2. Republican  
3. No party affiliation  
4. Prefer not to answer 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement using the scale below.  
[Participants will rate these statements on a seven-point scale -3= strongly 
disagree, 3= strongly agree] 
Atheists are the cause of moral decline in society (because of atheist influence 
people have fewer morals)  
 
Please answer the following questions:  
[Participants will choose from the options below the questions]  
  
Please use the text entry box below to tell us what you think this study was about  
(Participants use text entry box, this will be used to see if they bought the 
deception)  
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